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NOTE
CITY OF MIL WA UKEE V. ILLINOIS: THE

DEMISE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
NUISANCE ACTIONS IN INTERSTATE
WATER POLLUTION DISPUTES

N 1972 the State of Illinois instituted proceedings in federal district
court against the city of Milwaukee and several area sewage commissions, seeking abatement of the public nuisance allegedly created by
sewage discharged by the defendants.' Specifically, Illinois claimed that
discharge of inadequately treated sewage from treatment plants and overflows polluted the state's territorial waters of Lake Michigan, thereby causing harm to the citizens of Illinois. 2 Illinois' action was based on the
federal common law of nuisance involving interstate waters. 3 The defend1. The State of Illinois originally had filed a bill of complaint under the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, seeking abatement of sewage discharges by
defendant municipalities located in Wisconsin. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
93 (1972). See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976), which provides that the Supreme Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of "[all controversies between two or more States."
The Court's original jurisdiction in such controversies is constitutionally mandated under
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl, 2. Illinois alleged jurisdiction based upon a characterization of
defendants as "instrumentalities" of the State of Wisconsin. 406 U.S. at 94. Accordingly,
the state claimed, the suit could not properly be brought in any other court. Id Stating that
"[i]t is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship, political subdivisions are
citizens of their respective States," the Court held that although Wisconsin could be joined
as a defendant in the abatement action, its joinder was not mandatory. Id. at 97. The Court
concluded that the word "States" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976), did not include
political subdivisions. 406 U.S. at 98. The Court further concluded that the suit was within
the jurisdiction of the federal district courts because the issues raised in the action involved
federal common law, and represented, therefore, actions "arising under the 'laws' of the
United States." Id. at 98-99; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (providing for federal district
court jurisdiction of civil actions arising under United States laws).
2. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The state
additionally alleged that the sewage discharges accelerated the eutrophication of Lake Michigan, thereby threatening the ecological health of that lake. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979). In eutrophication, nutrients introduced into a lake in
sewage discharges stimulate the growth of animal and plant life, the subsequent decay of
which depletes shallow water oxygen. Additionally, the influx of nutrients may stimulate
the growth of undesirable plant and animal species. See Richerson & McEvoy, The Measurement ofEnvironmental Quality and its Incorporation into the Planning Process, in ENvIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 114-15 (C. Goldman, J. McEvoy & P.
Richerson eds. 1973). Subsequent to filing of suit, the State of Michigan intervened as a
plaintiff on the eutrophication issue. 599 F.2d at 155.
3. 366 F. Supp. at 299. Illinois also alleged causes of action based on state common
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ants contended in a motion to dismiss that any cause of action that may
have existed based on the federal common law of nuisance was preempted
by the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA).4 The district court granted the motion,5 and subsequently

granted relief to Illinois, entering judgment specifying effluent limitations,
and establishing a timetable for construction of control facilities. 6 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concurred with the lower court
that the Act, as amended, had not preempted the federal common law of
nuisance. The appellate court, however, reversed that part of the district
court's order that applied stricter effluent standards than those in defendant's permits and applicable Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. 7 Defendants appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court. Held, vacatedand remanded: by establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme for controlling water pollution in conjunction with a supervisory administrative agency, Congress preempted all remedies based on
the federal common law of nuisance previously available in interstate
water pollution disputes. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 68
L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981).

I.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN INTERSTATE WATER
POLLUTION DISPUTES

Traditionally, the common law nuisance action was the primary mechanism employed to resolve water pollution disputes.8 During the period of
rapid industrialization, the number and severity of the nation's pollution
problems greatly increased. As a result, the ad hoc approach of common
law nuisance actions proved to be an ineffective response to the complex,
large-scale disputes that had developed. 9 Consequently, in 1948 Congress
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.' 0 Although this Act was
amended continually to conform to changing conditions, it too was grossly
law nuisance law and violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001-1061 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1981-1982). 366 F. Supp. at 299.
4. 366 F. Supp. at 299; see Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. The 1972 amendments brought about significant changes
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat. 1155. For the
current version of the FWPCA, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. 366 F. Supp. at 302.
6. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 8 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 20,503, 20,503 (N.D. Il. Mar.
6, 1978). Between the commencement of trial and entry of judgment, a Wisconsin state
court rendered a judgment against the defendants, requiring them to comply with the effluent limitations in the permits to discharge pollutants issued to them by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1789, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 114, 120 (1981).
7. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. See McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, I U. FLA. L.
REV. 27, 37 (1948). Nuisance actions were first applied to pollution cases in William Aldred's Case, 7 Eng. Rep. 816, 821 (K.B. 1611).
9. Note, Federal Common Law and InterstatePollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 145152 (1972).
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat.1155 (current
version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
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inadequate to contend with the growing environmental crisis."l The Act
was particularly ineffective in resolving interstate water pollution disputes. 12 The deficiencies of the FWPCA in dealing with interstate controversies, however, were mitigated by applying the federal common law of
nuisance.
A.

The FederalCommon Law of Nuisance

In 1938 the Supreme Court established the general rule that the federal
courts are not at liberty to create and apply federal common law in all
litigation.' 3 The courts, however, do apply federal common law when an
overriding federal interest in the subject matter exists or when a need for
uniformity in applying the law is present.' 4 Federal courts also apply federal common law in interstate disputes to protect the sovereign interests of
the states involved.15 One state cannot resolve a transboundary conffict
without imposing its own law on another sovereign state, thereby violating
the fundamental tenets of federalism.16 Therefore, a state's sovereign right
to be free from injury caused by the actions of another state' 7 traditionally
has been protected by the federal common law. Both of these considerations occur in interstate water pollution disputes. The federal government
has a strong interest in maintaining the purity of interstate waters; additionally, the sovereign right of individual states to be free from injury
caused by another state's pollution of transboundary waterways deserves
11. The primary deficiency in the FWPCA prior to the 1972 amendments was the lack
of effective means of enforcement. See Barry, The Evolution ofthe Enforcement Provisionsof
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. A Study o the D?#Fcully in Developing Effective
Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1104-25 (1970); Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the
Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 369,
370-73 (1974).
12. The FWPCA held states responsible for developing water quality standards for intrastate waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970) (repealed 1976). Consequently, state officials
tended to disregard pollution discharges affecting neighboring states. See Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrftce? Problems ofFederalismin Mandating State ImplementationofNationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1227 (1977).
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
14. See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And ofthe New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 383, 405 (1964). Judge Friendlystated that
Erie led to the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in
every forum, and therefore is predictable and useful .... The clarion yet
careful pronouncement of Erie, "There is no federal general common law,"
opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized
federal common law.
Id (footnote omitted). See generally id at 405-22; Hill, The Law.Making Power ofthe FederalCourts.- ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
15. For cases involving the apportionment of interstate waters, see Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92 (1938); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907). For cases involving pollution of interstate waters, see Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
16. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907).
17. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
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protection.18
The Supreme Court has long recognized the applicability of the federal
common law of nuisance to interstate water pollution cases. In Missouri v.
Illinois19 the State of Missouri alleged that pollutants discharged into Lake
Michigan under Illinois state authority were deteriorating local water supplies. While the Supreme Court denied relief due to a lack of proof, it
nevertheless held that such an action was properly brought. 20 Only one
year later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. ,21 Justice Holmes reaffirmed
the Court's position that a state has a sovereign right to be free from outof-state nuisances, and that this right can be protected by an action in fed22
eral court.
More recently the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
applied the federal common law of nuisance to an interstate water pollution dispute in Texas v. Piankey.23 The court noted that a state possesses
certain ecological rights in its natural resources that are entitled to protection from impairment by external sources. 24 The court concluded that
these rights were best protected by application of federal common law because this approach would ensure uniformity
in dealing with the environ25
mental concerns of different states.
The Pankey decision foreshadowed the landmark decision of the
Supreme Court in 1972, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.26 The Court, in the
18. See Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240-42 (10th Cir. 1971).
19. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
20. Id. at 520-21.
21. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
22. Id. at 237. The Court described the state's interest in such an action as "quasisovereign" in nature; accordingly, the "State has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure
air." Id
23. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). The Pankey decision was strongly criticized in Note,
supra note 9.
24. In its discussion of the ecological rights of states, the court relied on the concept of
"quasi-sovereign" rights articulated in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907). 441 F.2d at 240.
25. 441 F.2d at 241. The court noted:
Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual
States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources outside its domain. . . .In the outside sources
of such impairment, more conflicting disputes, increasing assertions and proliferating contentions would seem to be inevitable. Until the field has been
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative
standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means
for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.
Id
26. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For a discussion of the procedural aspects of this decision, see
note I supra. Illinois v. CiQy of Milwaukee evoked extensive commentary. See, e.g., Campbell, Illinois P. City ofMilwaukee: Federal Question Jurisdiction Through Federal Common
Law, 3 ENVT'L L. 267 (1973); Comment, The Expansion ofFederal Common Law and Federal Question Jurisdictionto Interstate Pollution, 10 Hous. L. REV. 121 (1972); Comment,
Federal Common Law in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 141. See
generally Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicialy Established Effluent Standards as a
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latter case, approved the principle articulated by the Tenth Circuit in
Pankey: federal common law was available to abate a public nuisance in
interstate navigable waters. 27 As in Pankey, the Court reasoned that federal common law applied because of the interstate nature of the dispute
and the need for uniformity in dealing with interstate waters. 28 Moreover,
the Court held that application of federal common law was not precluded
by federal environmental legislation. 29 The Court first reviewed the existing environmental laws and noted that the remedy sought by Illinois
was not among those provided for by Congress. 30 The Court concluded,
however, that "the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily
the only federal remedies available"; 3 1 federal common law also was available as an additional means of redress. 32 Furthermore, federal environmental legislation did not constitute the "outer bounds" of federal
common law, but rather provided "useful guidelines" for the courts in
fashioning remedies. 33 The Court concluded by noting:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may
in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But
until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise
of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water
the equities
34
pollution.
Thus, the Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee left open the possibility
that federal common law could be preempted by future federal legislation
on the subject.
Only five months after the Illinois decision was announced, Congress
enacted the amendments to the FWPCA, commonly known as the Clean
Water Act of 1972 (CWA). 35 The CWA was Congress's most comprehensive and encompassing statement of federal water pollution policy to that
date.36 The CWA created a legislative-administrative partnership through
Remedy in FederalNuisanceActions, 7 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 293 (1978); Note, Federal
Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation?, 49 FORDHAM L.
REv. 500 (1981); Note, Federal Common Law Remediesfor the Abatement of Water Pollution,
5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (1977).
27. 406 U.S. at 103.
28. Id at 103-07.

[W]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of
decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we

have fashioned federal common law .... Certainly these same demands for
applying federal law are present in the pollution of a body of water such as
Lake Michigan, bounded, as it is, by four States.
Id at 105 n.6.
29. Id at 103, 107.
30. Id at 103; see note 11 supra.
31. 406 U.S. at 103.

32. Id
33. Id n.5.
34. Id at 107.
35. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816.

36. Congress viewed the previous versions of the FWPCA as "inadequate in every vital

REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprintedin A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1425 (1973)

aspect." S.

[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The bill was described as "the most compre-
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which specific regulatory programs were developed, implemented and, for
the first time, effectively enforced. 37 The existence of this elaborate legislative scheme presented the question of preemption of federal common law
in environmental disputes in a new light.
B. Preemptionof FederalCommon Law
The doctrine of separation of powers is a central principle of American
government. 38 The delicate balance of power between the branches of the
federal government is of vital importance to its successful operation and
has been strictly observed by the Supreme Court. 39 As a rule, the courts
are not free to develop and apply their own rules of decision in the face of

congressional legislation on the subject.4° The courts do have the power,

however, to develop federal law in the "interstitial regions," those areas of
law not specifically addressed by statute, in order to effectuate the legislative policies expressed in the statutory scheme. 4' In New Jersey v. New
York,42 a case involving interstate water apportionment, the Court recognized that federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of
Congress." 43 Later, in Clea ield Trust Co. v. United States, 44 the Court
elaborated on this rule by suggesting that federal common law should be
applied only in the absence of congressional action. 45 The courts followed
this perception of the appropriate application of federal common law in
cases involving interstate waters. 46 The courts generally applied federal
hensive and far-reaching water pollution bill we have ever drafted."
supra, at 369 (remarks of Rep. Mizell).
37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1361 (1976).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

38. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU126-27 (1978); Clark, Separation of Powers, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 1 (1974).
39. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978).
40. The Supreme Court has stated:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course
consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the me"a$.n of an enactment is discerned and the
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not
sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.
Id See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) ("the courts are not
free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that [congressional legislation] becomes
meaningless"); Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollutior Statutory Preemption or
Preservation?, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 500 (1981).
41. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (federal
common law applied to prevent impairment of federal statutory programs for land acquisition); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (court applied
federal common law when it enforced arbitration agreement in suit brought under § 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)
(duty of federal courts to fashion governing rule of federal law in determining rights and
duties of United States on commercial paper that it issues, because of the need for uniformity); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (federal
common law applied to uphold federal policies, evinced by Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 264 (1940), protecting Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
42. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
43. Id at 348.
44. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
45. Id at 367.
46. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (pollution of interTIONAL LAW
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common law in these cases because federal legislation on the subject was
by no means comprehensive, and federal common law was necessary to fill
gaps in the statutory scheme in order to effectuate clear congressional intent.47 Since the enactment of the CWA, however, the federal courts have
been divided on the question of whether the CWA preempted the federal
common law of nuisance.
The Fourth Circuit, in Committeefor the Considerationof the Jones Falls
Sewage System v. Train,48 refused to circumvent the CWA by imposing
stricter common law remedies. The court could not reconcile the fact that
federal common law could prohibit conduct that was expressly permitted
by the CWA, and rejected the common law remedy to prevent what it perceived as an anomalous result.49 More recently, however, the Third Circuit in National Sea ClammersAssociation v. City of New York 50 bypassed
the procedural notice requirements of the CWA and held that a federal
nuisance action by a private party was valid. 5 1 Due to the varying federal
decisions regarding the preemptive consequences of the CWA, the status of
the federal common law nuisance action as a tool for environmental control became confused.
II.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS

Against this background, the Supreme Court reviewed in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois the Seventh Circuit's holding that the 1972 amendments
52
to the FWPCA had not preempted the federal common law of nuisance.
5
3
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, recognized the importance of
interstate common law to controversies not specifically covered by federal
legislation, 54 but found that the regulatory program established under the
CWA directly addressed the sewage overflows in question.55
The Court's decision suggested that when no gaps are to be filled in the
regulatory framework, the federal courts are not free to apply federal common law. 56 In City of Milwaukee the majority clearly viewed the CWA as
state waters of Lake Michigan); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963) (apportionment of waters of the Colorado River among neighboring states); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971) (federal common law applies until field is occupied by comprehen-

sive legislation or administrative regulatory scheme).
47. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972). See also notes 811 supra and accompanying text.
48. 539 F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (4th Cir. 1976).
49. Id at 1009.
50. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), vacatedsub non. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981).
51. 616 F.2d at 1235.
52. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979).
53. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, and Powell.
54. 101 S. Ct. at 1790, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 124 (1981) ("When Conlress has not spoken to a
particular issue, however. . . the Court has found it necessary, m a 'few and restricted'
instances to develop federal common law") (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651
(1963)).
55. 101 S.Ct. at 1795, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 130.
56. Id See also Note, supra note 40, at 517.
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comprehensive legislation. 57 As such, the interstitial areas, previously recognized by the Court as adaptable to federal nuisance law, 58 were eliminated by the enactment of the 1972 amendments.
The majority in City ofMilwaukee began its analysis of the preemption
question with a review of prior Court decisions in which federal common
law doctrines were displaced by legislation. 59 In support of this rationale,
Justice Rehnquist carefully distinguished his analysis from that used to
determine whether federal law preempts state law in a particular field.60
Federal preemption of state law concerns basic notions of federalism and
requires a showing of a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt. 6 ' In discussing whether federal statutory or federal common law
governs a given field, the inquiry begins with the assumption that the legislative branch is to develop federal law.62 According to the majority, there-

fore, the question is not whether Congress has explicitly proscribed the use
of federal common law, but merely whether Congress has occupied the
63
field.

Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent,64 was dissatisfied with the
Court's distinction between federal preemption of state law and congres-

sional displacement of common law.6 5 He maintained that the simplistic,

"automatic displacement" approach used by the majority was inadequate
in two respects. He argued first that the analysis ignored the unique role of
federal common law in resolving interstate disputes, and secondly, that it
failed to acknowledge the usefulness of common law doctrines in furthering federal policies. 66 In support of these contentions, Justice Blackmun
relied on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 67 and related cases standing for

the proposition that each state has a right to federal protection from outof-state nuisances. 68 He implied that such protection is provided through
57. 101 S. Ct. at 1792, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 126.
58. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
59. 101 S. Ct. at 1791, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 125. The Court quoted extensively from Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
60. 101 S. Ct. at 1792 n.9, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 126 n.9.
61. Id at 1792, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 126. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959) (requiring "due regard for the presuppositions of [the] embracing federal system").
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1792, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 126.
63. Id at 1796, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 131. The Court stated the test as follows: "Demanding
specific regulations of general applicability before concluding that Congress has addressed
the problem to the exclusion of federal common law asks the wrong question. The question
is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
manner." Id
64. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justices Marshall and
Stevens.
65. 101 S. Ct. at 1800 n.2, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 137 n.2. Justice Blackmun recognized, however, the distinction between the interests of federalism which exist in assessing federal preemption of state law and the issues of separation of powers present in City ofaMlwaukee. Id
66. Id at 1801, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 137.
67. 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
68. 101 S. Ct. at 1801, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 138.
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application of federal common law doctrines. 69 The dissent also emphasized the importance of interstitial federal law-making as a basic responsibility of the federal courts, relying heavily on the Court's previous decision
in Illinois to apply federal nuisance law in the face of an abundance of
pertinent legislation. 70 Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that federal interest in a field should support, rather than preclude, the application of federal common law principles.7 ' Thus, he
reasoned that the proper question is not merely whether Congress has occupied the field, but whether Congress specifically intended to supplant
preexisting federal remedies.' 2 The dissent stated that the duty of a reviewing court should be to examine the73 specific congressional intent as
well as the magnitude of the legislation.
The majority, however, did examine the congressional intent in some
detail. Focusing on the legislative history surrounding the 1972 amendments, Justice Rehnquist placed great emphasis on the abundance of legislative commentary proclaiming the comprehensive and all-encompassing
character of the amendments. 74 Based on this perception of congressional
intent, the majority had little difficulty in finding that both the problem of
effluent limitations and overflows were covered by the Act. 75
Justice Blackmun contended that the generalized references to the comprehensive nature of the Act relied on by the majority were entitled to little
weight. 76 Instead, he centered his attention on section 505(e) of the Act,
the citizen suit provision, which declares that "[n]othing in this section
shall restrict any right which any person.

. .

may have under any statute

or common law." 77 Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the dissent interpreted "common law" to include federal common law. 7"
69. Id at 1800-02, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 137-38. See generally Hill, supra note 14, at 1026-42;
Leybold, supra note 26, at 294-301.
70. 101 S.Ct. at 1802, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 138-39. See also United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
71. See 101 S. Ct. at 1802, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 138-39.
72. Id at 1803, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
73. Id, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 140. Justice Blackmun stated: "Tlo say that Congress 'has
spoken'. . . is only to begin the inquiry; the critical question is what Congress has said."
Id n.8 (quoting the majority, id at 179 n.8, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 125 n.8). See also Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (Congress preempted questions of deductions,
based on dereliction of duty, against a seaman's claim to his wages by excluding all deductions except those explicitly listed).
74. 101 S.Ct. at 1792-93, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 127-28. The Court cited LEOISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 36, at 350-51 (remarks of Chairman Blatnik indicating that the amendments were a "total restructuring" and "complete rewriting" of the existing legislation).
75. 101 S.Ct. at 1792, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 126.
76. Id at 1805-06, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 142-43.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
78. 101 S.Ct. at 1804, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 141; see National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of
New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233 n.31 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated sub neom. Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981);
California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)
(court allowed action brought under federal common law of nuisance against county commissioners for approval of construction permits for hotel-casinos on shores of Lake Tahoe),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). See also Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623,
626 (7th Cir. 1980) (Seventh Circuit validated a federal common law nuisance action
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The majority, however, held that the entire savings clause was irrelevant. They contended that the phrase "in this section," limited the effect of
the savings clause to citizen suits. 79 Further, Justice Rehnquist argued that

section 510,80 which reserves to the states the right to impose stricter limitations than those enumerated in the statute, applies only to intrastate polluters through application of state administrative processes or nuisance
law. 81 Thus, only state, not federal,
common law is available for enforce82
ment of more stringent standards.
While both opinions focused largely on the intent of the Congress, additional considerations supported the decision. Initially, the majority indicated that the application of federal common law was peculiarly
inappropriate in light of the complexity of the problems associated with
water pollution control.8 3 Justice Blackmun rejected this argument and
pointed to the fact that the EPA itself often used federal nuisance law remedies where appropriate.8 4 Additionally, the Court emphasized the fact
that the permit granting process of the Act provided Illinois with a forum
in which to protect its interests.8 5 Prior to the Act's amendments the plaintiff had no available forum unless federal common law was judicially created. 86 Justice Blackmun contended, however, that because the hearing
procedures were not in place until two years after Illinois commenced the
action, denying relief on that basis would be unfair. 87 Furthermore, he
argued that Congress had intended the hearing process to be a voluntary
option, rather than a jurisdictional bar.88
The majority opinion in City of Milwaukee sends a clear message to the
lower federal courts that they are not free to supplement congressional
water pollution policy by creation of federal nuisance law. This holding
significantly alters the former methodology of the national water pollution
control effort. 89 The new approach will have varying effects on the resolubrought by Illinois against in-state polluter (see note 95 supra)), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3152, 69
L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1981).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 1798, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 133-34.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
81. 101 S. Ct. at 1797-98, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 132-33.
82. Id The Court cited Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), for the
proposition that state common law would control a claim such as Illinois'. 101 S. Ct. at 1797
n.19, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 132 n.19.
83. 101 S.Ct. at 1796, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 131.
84. Id at 1807-08, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 145. The EPA consistently has viewed interstate
common law as a supplementary mechanism to the CWA. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 27-29, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 68 L. Ed. 2d 114
(1981); see Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Note,
supra note 40, at 529. As the primary enforcement agency, the EPA's views are entitled to
substantial deference. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1977).
85. 101 S. Ct. at 1797, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 132. The majority found significant the availability of public hearings established under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1976). 101 S. Ct. at 1797, 68
L. Ed. 2d at 132.
86. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
87. The dissent acknowledged the existence of the forum but argued that it did not
preclude the use of other forums. 101 S. Ct. at 1807 n.19, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 144 n.19.
88. Id at 1807, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 144.
89. In the wake of the decision in City of Milwaukee, the former widespread use of
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tion of interstate water pollution disputes, but it is likely to reduce the
flexibility that may be needed to resolve special problems on a case-bycase basis. Nevertheless, the advantages of uniformity, in an area replete

with uncertainty, may outweigh any loss in flexibility. Before conclusions
may be drawn, however, the effect of the decision must be examined in
light of the two federal interests relied upon in Illinois and recognized by
the dissent.
The federal interest in protection of the nation's waterways is not significantly affected by the holding. 90 The CWA clearly is a comprehensive and
all-encompassing statement of federal water pollution policy. Its detailed
regulatory regime and complex enforcement procedures adequately protect the federal interest in the purity of our navigable waters. In this sense,
creation of federal common law is an unnecessary judicial encroachment
upon the legislative scheme.
In the past, however, some federal courts have sidestepped the procedural and substantive requirements of the CWA in the name of effectuating
federal policy. Although not mentioned in the majority opinion, National
Sea Clammers Association v. City of New York 9 presents an example of
such a case. In National Sea Clammers the Third Circuit allowed the
plaintiffs to avoid statuory notice procedures required by the CWA by permitting them to bring a common law nuisance action. 92 In so doing, the
court also ignored the fact that the city of New York was operating under a
valid EPA permit. 93 By circumventing the statutory procedures and invalidating conduct authorized by the EPA, the court clearly interfered with
legislative action.94 The NationalSea Clammers case was appealed to the
Supreme Court and decided shortly after City of Milwaukee. Thus, the
Court was presented with an immediate opportunity to establish the effects
of the holding in City of Milwaukee.9 5
The Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association 96 reiterated the position announced in City of Milwaukee that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely preempted by the CWA. On this basis, the Court
federal common law remedies by the EPA inevitably will cease. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 27-29, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 68 L. Ed. 2d
114 (1981).
90. See Note, supra note 40, at 512-13.
91. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated sub non Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981).
92. 616 F.2d at 1225-26.
93. While the Illinois Court recognized that federal common law remedies were not
barred by the statutory regime, it contemplated an intersitial remedy rather than the creation
of a substantive body of law outside the statute. See Note, supra note 40, at 517.
94. See id at 516.
95. The Court also granted certiorari and vacated the judgment in Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Illinois, 101 . Ct. 3152, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1981), in light of the decision in City of
Milwaukee. The Seventh Circuit in OutboardMarine had held that Illinois could sue a
Zrivate intrastate polluter regardless of the lack of extraterritorial effects. Illinois v. Outard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3152, 69 L. Ed. 2d

1000 (1981).
96. 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981).
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summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' federal common law claims. 97 The decision in Middlesex County underscores the effect of the Court's holding in
City of Milwaukee: compliance with the requirements of the CWA is a
complete defense to a federal common law nuisance action. As noted by
the dissent in Middlesex County,98 this effect may be contrary to congressional intent. Nevertheless, both Middlesex County and City of Milwaukee
eliminate errant and intrusive judicial law-making in this area.
The federal interest in resolution of interstate conflicts, however, was
apparently ignored by the City of Milwaukee majority. Historically, federal common law has been applied to resolve disputes involving the quasisovereign rights of states in interstate resources. 99 The majority's decision
1 to interstate water
precludes application of "interstate common law ' l°
the policy of the
that
conceded
majority
the
While
pollution disputes.
. . . rights of
primary
the
protect
and
preserve,
CWA is to "recognize,
0 1 Justice Rehnquist failed to acknowledge that such rights have
States,"
long been considered of primary importance and worthy of federal protection by the Court.
The CWA allows the states to promulgate stricter effluent standards than
those provided in the Act.' 0 2 It has no provision, however, for enforcement of those standards against neighboring states in transboundary pollution disputes.' 0 3 When state programs are in conflict, as in City of
Milwaukee, the CWA provides no means for protecting the state's sovereign ecological rights. Federal common law properly could be used to fill
the gap left by the Legislature.
The majority suggests that the permit-granting process provides the
complaining state a forum in which to recommend adoption of its own
stricter standards. °4 While this process may be effective in some instances, the elimination of federal common law nuisance remedies may
leave unprotected the sovereign rights of the States to be free from transboundary pollution. This could upset the balance of federalism in the
Union by creating tension between the states and encouraging political
battles in Congress.
III.

CONCLUSION

City of Milwaukee V.Illinois represents a significant change in the methodology of the nation's water pollution control program. The Supreme
Court reconsidered its 1972 decision in Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee in light
97. Id at 2627, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 451-52.
98. Id at 2632, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 458.
99. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
100. The phrase "interstate common law" first was used in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 98 (1907), to describe the federal common law developed to resolve disputes over interstate resources.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).

102. Id § 1370.

103. Id § 1342(b). The CWA addresses conflicting state programs only insofar as it provides for recommendation of standards by the complaining state.
104. 101 S. Ct. at 1797, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 132.
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of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA and concluded that the comprehensive statutory scheme enacted by Congress precluded actions for water
pollution damage based on the federal common law of nuisance. In so
doing, the Court eliminated an important mechanism of water pollution
control while protecting the delicate balance inherent in the doctrine of
separation of powers.
William A. Chiltenden III

